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Abstract Using a bioeconomic model of a coral reef-mangrove-seagrass system, we
analyze the dynamic path of incentives to achieve an efficient transition to the steady state
levels of fish biomass and mangrove habitat conservation. Our model nests different types
of species habitat dependency and allows for changes in the extent of habitat to affect the
growth rate and the long-run fish level. We solve the two-control, two-state non-linear opti-
mal control problem numerically and compute the input efficiency frontier characterizing the
tradeoff between mangrove habitat and fish population. After identifying the optimal locus
on the frontier, we determine the optimal transition path to the frontier from a set of initial
conditions to illustrate the necessary investments. Finally, we demonstrate how dynamic con-
servation incentives (payments for ecosystem services) for a particular habitat with multiple
services are interdependent, change over time, and can be greater than contemporaneous
fishing profits when the ecosystem is degraded.
Keywords Optimal control · Bioeconomic · Rebuilding · Collocation · Habitat
JEL Classification Q22
1 Introduction
In a recent review of the theory and practice of ecosystem service provision, Daily and
Matson (2008) argue that despite increasing awareness of ecosystems as natural capital assets,
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several key scientific components, such as ecosystem production functions, are not suf-
ficiently understood and this is a “limiting factor” for incorporating these functions into
resource management decisions. In general, these production functions are dynamic process
models that map the structure and operation of the biological and physical components of
the ecosystems into the provision of services.
In this paper, we develop a structural representation of multiple ecosystem service
provision in a production function framework, using fish dynamics in a coupled coral reef-
mangrove-seagrass environment as our model system. Our ecological model nests facultative
and obligate species-habitat associations, where in the obligate setting the species is entirely
dependent on mangroves and in the facultative setting the species is not (Rönnbäck 1999;
Sanchirico and Mumby 2009).
We couple the ecological dynamics to a model of a benevolent social planner that deter-
mines the optimal path of catches and development of the mangrove habitat over time to
maximize the net present value from fishing, conversion, and in situ mangrove values.1
Although most of the literature has focused either on how mangroves protect from tsunamis
and hurricanes (Barbier et al. 2008) or on the role of mangroves in the production of coral
reef fish (Nagelkerken et al. 2002), we incorporate both sets of values along with values
associated with the development of the habitat (e.g. aquaculture ponds).
Our approach is most similar to Swallow (1990), who develops a model to investigate
the optimal development of coastal habitat (a non-renewable, non-restorable resource) that
also provides habitat for a biological stock (a renewable resource) that is being optimally
harvested. We extend Swallow (1990) by developing an ecological model that nests different
species-habitat relationships and by considering the use of restoration (reversible develop-
ment). Restoration is an important management tool to consider in general2 and in our system
because worldwide mangroves are being converted at a rate of 1–2% per year (Duke et al.
2007) and approximately 35–50% have been cleared (Valiela et al. 2001).
Using our framework, we calculate the input efficiency frontier or tradeoff curve between
steady-state fish population and mangrove conversion, depicted in stylized form in Fig. 1
(obligate association). The curve is similar to the type of tradeoff analysis in Polasky et al.
(2008) and Nalle et al. (2004), who consider the tradeoffs between benefits from habitat use
and loss of either biodiversity or a single species population. However, since the production
function approach supports a single objective function with multiple sources of value, we are
able to identify the efficient long-run optimal locus (e.g. either B1, B2, or B3) on the frontier.
After identifying the trade-off curve and optimal locus, we ask how a coastal planner might
optimally go from an interior point to the trade-off curve. That is, we solve numerically for
the optimal transition from an interior “status quo” point, for example, from point A to point
B1 in Fig. 1. To our knowledge, this question has not yet been considered in the discussion
on ecosystem service provision.
Along the optimal dynamic path, we identify the mix of mangrove and fishing policy and
how these optimal policies depend on the nature of the species-habitat relationships. For
example, in Fig. 1 where the transition involves restoring mangroves and building the fish
population in the long run, we explore whether the path involves a monotonic approach as in
curves 1 and 2 or a transitory overshoot of the optimal mangrove steady state as in curve 3.
We also investigate how these paths differ when only a subset of the values (nursery habitat
1 Coastal development and conversion for aquaculture are two primary drivers of mangrove habitat loss
(Lal 1990).
2 For example, as part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Stimulus Bill), the U.S.
National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration received $167 million to restore coastal habitat (see,
e.g., http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/habitat/restoration/ last accessed March 15, 2010).
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Fig. 1 Tradeoff curve for
optimal fish population size and
share of mangrove habitat
removed by development. Points
on the curve (B1, B2, and B3)
represent possible optimal
steady-states. Curves from A to
B1 represent alternative transition
pathways
and development) is included in the planner’s objective as opposed to the case when multiple
values are considered (storm protection, nursery habitat, development).
The final contribution of the paper is to use the model to identify the payment for ecosystem
service (PES) schedule for mangroves that corresponds to the optimal trajectory. Payments
could be either in the form of taxes/subsidies from the government to private coastal land-
owners or from a fishing sector where the rights to the fish catch have been appropriated,
for example, with a territorial use right, cooperative, or some other catch share program. We
find that when one habitat (e.g. mangroves) is an input into multiple services (e.g. storm
protection and fishery productivity) that the optimal PES schedule for each service is inter-
dependent. These payments depend on the economic and ecological context, especially with
a provisioning ecosystem service such as fish catches. For example, in our study system,
the optimal schedule of additional incentives for conserving mangroves is a function of the
quality of seagrass beds and depends on the relative value of the sectors using the mangroves
(fish, development and storm protection). The dependency stems from provision of the fish
catches using both mangroves and seagrass as inputs. The latter effect also varies based on the
nature of the species-habitat relationship. We also find that when the ecosystem is degraded
the PES payment can exceed contemporaneous fishing profits, which raises concerns about
when PES can be self-financing and, if not, whether there is access to the necessary capital
to fund payments. Furthermore, our results highlight that designing incentive payment pro-
grams requires detailed knowledge about the ecological production functions along with the
economic conditions of those receiving/demanding the services.
The organization of the paper is as follows. In the next section, we introduce the ecologi-
cal-economic model by first discussing the ecology. We then derive the optimality conditions
and the “golden rule” equations for mangroves and fish populations. The investigation of
how to get from an interior point to the optimal point on the frontier is carried out using
numerical techniques, which are described after the optimality conditions. The numerical
analysis, including a sensitivity analysis precedes the conclusion.
2 Ecological-Economic Model
Our modeling structure fits within the ecological production function approach with man-
groves and seagrass as inputs that contribute to the production of fish (as reviewed in Barbier
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(2007)). The production function dictates how the fish population changes over time in
response to availability and use of mangrove habitats and other ecological processes, such
as density-dependence. The ecological model is embedded in an economic framework that
maps fish production to fish profits in each time period.
Another approach to valuing mangroves is the market value approach, which calculates
fisheries production value of mangroves as the gross revenues of all fish that are observed or
thought to be directly or indirectly associated with mangroves (Naylor and Drew 1998; Gren
and Soderqvist 1994; Rönnbäck 1999). While this approach allows for a relatively quick
and simple estimate of value across a broad set of marine species, the approach does not
take into account fishing costs and implicitly assumes that population dependence on man-
groves is absolute. Because planning decisions affecting mangroves, and coastal habitat in
general, are often incremental choices over restoration, conversion or preservation of habitat,
the production methods are advantageous from a policy perspective in their ability to value
marginal changes in the extent of mangroves in terms of lost fishery profits or returns from
development (Bockstael et al. 2000).
In this section, we describe the ecological model and the social planner’s optimization
problem where the choice variables are fishing catch and mangrove conversion in each period
and the state variables are the fish stock and the proportion of the mangrove habitat conserved.
2.1 Ecological Model
Previous approaches to model mangrove-fishery linkages, and more generally species-habitat
associations, make some important ecological assumptions that potentially limit the ability
of the methods to be applied in other settings.3 A standard approach is to assume that the
population carrying capacity is proportional to the extent of the habitat, usually in a linear
fashion (e.g. Barbier and Strand 1998). However, as Freeman (1993) argues, environmental
parameters are likely to influence both upper limits on population size and intrinsic growth
rates. Mumby et al. (2004), for example, discuss how mangroves function as a nursery habitat
and thereby increase “survivorship of young fish”.4
A second typical assumption is that the dependence of the population on the habitat is
absolute. Rönnbäck (1999) makes the distinction between obligate use, where mangroves
are absolutely necessary for fish survival, and facultative use, where mangroves supplement
fisheries production but are not required. Ecologists have shown that species utilize different
habitats at different stages in their lives. For example, some fish like the bluestriped grunt
(Haemulon sciurus) or schoolmaster (Lutjanus apodus) take advantage of seagrass beds
as juveniles, and then—if the habitat is available—they stop over in mangroves to further
develop before finally migrating to their adult stage habitat in coral reefs (Mumby et al. 2004).
Other species, however, might recruit directly to their adult coral reef habitat (e.g. Chromis
cyanea), as examined in Rodwell et al. (2003).
We extend the ecological model of Sanchirico and Mumby (2009) that is based on the
empirical findings of Mumby et al. (2004) to incorporate density dependence in the recruit-
ment of juveniles to the adult population. The implication of this extension is that the avail-
ability of different habitat along with ontogenic migrations of the species affects both the
3 Barbier (2000, 2007) reviews several techniques for valuing the mangroves as inputs in fisheries production
functions, including both static and dynamic modeling approaches.
4 In a global survey of the broad dependence of coastal fisheries on mangroves, Rönnbäck (1999) cites food
abundance, predation refuge, and larval retention as the primary hypotheses explaining the importance of
mangroves as fish habitats.
123
Ecological and Economic Dynamics 247
Fig. 2 Life-cycle schematic for
the mangrove, sea grass, and
coral-reef fish population model
carrying capacity and the growth rate of the population. Sanchirico and Mumby (2009) only
consider the case of growth rates.
The model describes a biological (fish) species whose life-cycle spans coral reef, seagrass
bed and mangrove habitats as depicted in Fig. 2. Adults are sedentary and subject to a fixed
rate of natural mortality (μ) and a time-varying rate of fishing pressure on a coral reef (ht ).
New individuals recruit to the reef either directly from seagrass beds or after an intermediate
nursery stage within mangroves.
In any period, the share of the juveniles produced from the adult, reef-based population
(Nt ) is equal to J (Nt ) = θ N γt where γ and θ are non-negative. Egg production is often
thought to follow increasing returns to scale per individual and we can model this with the
assumption that γ is greater than one. The parameter θ could be modeled as a function of the
coverage and quality of the seagrass beds, but for simplicity we assume that it is a constant
parameter.
From the total amount of juveniles produced, a fraction goes from the seagrass beds
directly to the reef where they are susceptible to mortality on the reef. The fraction of J (Nt )
that migrates directly to the reef is denoted by (1−W [Mt ]), where W [Mt ] ∈ [0, 1] is assumed
to be a continuous function of the extent of mangrove habitat that currently exists, Mt . For
simplicity, we measure Mt as a proportion of the mangrove coverage in a pristine and undis-
turbed setting. We define the survivorship rate for juveniles that recruit directly from the
seagrass beds to the reef as Sr .
On the other hand, the fraction of J (Nt ) that migrates to the mangroves (W [Mt ]) has a
survivorship rate (Sm) that is greater than for those that go directly to the reef: Sm > Sr
(Chittaro et al. 2005). The increased survivorship for species that utilize the mangroves
occurs, because they are less susceptible to predation than those that go directly to the reef
(Aburto-Oropeza et al. 2008).
The type of functional response captured by W [Mt ] to the changes in the coverage of man-
groves is not immediately evident, though it will likely depend on the species, oceanographic
conditions, and spatial distances between the different types of habitats (Mumby et al. 2004;
Chittaro et al. 2005; Aburto-Oropeza et al. 2009). Following Sanchirico and Mumby (2009),
we impose the following conditions: (1) if there are no mangroves, the fraction of juvenile
fish utilizing them is zero (W [0] = 0); (2) even when the mangroves are at their maximum
extent, some of the juveniles might recruit directly from seagrass to reef (W [1] ≤ 1); and
(3) the fraction utilizing the mangroves increases as the coverage of mangroves increases,
everything else being equal (dW [Mt ]/d Mt > 0). Support for the last property is found in
Simpson et al. (2005) who showed that larvae of reef fish sense the presence of settlement
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habitat and swim towards it, using either sound or chemical signatures of different habitats
(see also Arvedlund and Takemura (2006). By focusing on the fraction of cover, we also put
aside the complexity of distinguishing between depth and perimeter coverage of mangroves.
In the Gulf of California, Aburto-Oropeza et al. (2008) found that the depth of the mangrove
habitat is less important for fisheries production than the coastal perimeter of habitat, because
most species remain within the edge area.
Putting the components together, recruitment to the reef at time t is equal to:













+ (1 − W [Mt ])Sr )
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Share and survisorship
of juveniles that go
directly to the reef
. (1)
Equation 1 allows for a facultative association between mangroves and reproduction that
is dependent on the levels of survivorship in reef and mangrove habitats. In such a setting,
the mangroves provide an enhancement to overall effective survivorship, but the reefs are
still able to supply new recruits even when mangroves are absent. The obligate relationship
occurs when survivorship of direct recruits to the reef, Sr , is equal to zero. In this case, the
reef population is entirely dependent on recruits from the mangroves and if the mangroves
are completely removed, the population will go extinct.
Following Armsworth (2002), the density-dependent process is captured by recruits com-
peting with other recruits for space and resources during settlement. In particular, we assume
that recruits enter the reef according to a Beverton-Holt recruitment function, g(Rt ) =
b1 Rt/(1 + b2 Rt ) where b1 describes the survival rate at low densities, and b1/b2 is the
saturation limit with respect to the recruitment.
Combining recruitment, fishing and natural mortality, the instantaneous rate of change for
the fish stock on the reef is:
d Nt
dt
= b1 Rt (Nt , Mt )
1 + b2 Rt (Nt , Mt ) − μNt − ht . (2)
To illustrate how mangroves affect the long-run equilibrium level of the reef population,
we derive the analytical expression for the unexploited steady-state equilibrium of Eq. 2
as a function of the mangrove coverage. Under the assumption that γ is equal to one, the
equilibrium population is:
N ss(M) = b1
b2μ
− 1
b2θ [W (M)Sm + (1 − W (M))Sr ] . (3)
Inspection of Eq. 3 reveals that if b1 or θ increases, then the steady-state population will
increase, everything else being equal. The direction of change in N ss from a change in b2
is ambiguous. We also find that an increase in survivorship of juveniles arriving from either
habitat or a decrease in natural mortality increases the equilibrium population on the reef.
The change in the unexploited steady-state population with a change in M is equal to:
d N ss
d M
= (Sm − Sr )




Equation 4 is positive for all levels of mangrove coverage, given the assumption that man-
groves increase survivorship (Sm > Sr ). The magnitude of the change depends on the
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difference in the survivorship in the two habitats and the how an increase in mangrove cov-
erage affects the share of juveniles that utilize the habitat, everything else being equal.
The extent of mangroves connected (within a certain distance) to the reef depends on
whether the planner engages in restoration or clearing. The mechanism by which these activ-
ities translate into changes in mangrove coverage is described by a conversion production
function, F(Dt ). The mangrove dynamics are
d Mt
dt
= F(Dt ) (5)
where Dt is effort devoted to mangrove conversion at time t , which can be positive (clearing
for development) or negative (restoration) and F(Dt ) is the time rate of change in mangroves.5
Equation (5) models a process where mangrove conversion is reversible (though conversion
is costly), which differs from Swallow (1990), who only considers irreversible development.
Of course, since we include restoration or clearing as a control variable in our economic
model, the planner can decide whether reversing development is optimal. Reversible devel-
opment is more likely, for example, when the mangroves are cleared for aquaculture, such
as shrimp farms.6
We account for asymmetry in the ability to restore mangroves and clearing mangroves
within F(Dt ) by assuming that the marginal change d F(Dt )/d Dt depends on whether Dt
is positive or negative. In particular, we assume that the equation of motion for mangroves
has the following properties: F(0) = 0, FD < 0, FDD ≤ 0.7 This captures the notion that
restoring mangroves may be more difficult than clearing mangroves. Since developed areas
would likely be protected from mangrove encroachment, we do not include a natural growth
process for mangroves that could change the extent of coverage over time.
2.2 Economic Model
Similar to Swallow (1990) and following the long tradition in bioeconomic modeling (Clark
1990), we model a benevolent social planner that can choose the level of mangrove conver-
sion and fish catch in each period. In our most general formulation, controls are chosen to
maximize the net present value from fishing, development, and mangrove protection.










= b1 Rt (Nt , Mt )




0 ≤ Mt ≤ 1
5 Given that we rescaled Mt to be a proportion of the maximum extent (pristine area), the rate of mangrove
conversion, Dt , is correspondingly scaled to be in the same units.
6 We are currently assuming that restored habitat is substitutable for pristine habitat. Most likely, the substi-
tutability is not perfect, at least in the short run. We plan in future work to consider this possibility within the
context of a specific place.
7 Another approach would be to include two control variables, one for restoration and one for development.
While such a model might better capture the on-the-ground realities, it is unlikely to change the qualitative
conclusions of our analysis.
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0 ≤ Nt , 0 ≤ ht
Nt=0, Mt=0
where δ is the discount rate, π(ht , Nt ) is fishing profit in time t , B(1−Mt ) is the benefits from
the extent of development given by 1 − Mt , C(Dt ) is the cost of converting mangroves, and
P(Mt ) is the in situ value of the mangroves that could be due to providing coastal protection
(Barbier et al. 2008) or from intrinsic value associated with the habitat. For simplicity, we
will refer to P(Mt ) as storm protection for the remainder of the paper. Mangroves, therefore,
contribute to the value of the system indirectly through the production of fish and directly in
their protection of the coastal area. Fishing profit is assumed to be increasing at a decreasing
rate in harvest and fish population on the reef (πh > 0, πhh ≤ 0, πN > 0, πN N ≤ 0).
We model the benefits of development, B(1 − Mt ), as a function of the amount of man-
groves cleared (e.g. extent of total development which is 1− Mt in any t) rather than from the
flow of conversion (Swallow 1990). Our approach is consistent with the idea that developed
areas will return a flow of rents from some alternative use. We model the total cost of conver-
sion by a quadratic function, which is symmetric with respect to zero and has the following
properties: C(0) = 0, CDD > 0 ∀D; CD > 0 if D > 0; and CD < 0 if D < 0. Because in
our set-up restoration is simply the negative of development, the appropriate interpretation of
the marginal cost of restoration is −CD and for the marginal cost of development is CD . The
increasing cost of conversion takes into account adjustment costs that penalize the planner
for either trying to ramp up restoration or development too quickly.
We also include the non-negativity restrictions on the states and control (fishing catch)
along with the restriction that Mt is bounded from above by one (by assumption).
2.3 Necessary Conditions
Because the constraints on the state variables affect the rate of change of N and M with
respect to time when the state variables are at the boundaries, we derive the current value
Lagrangian rather than Hamiltonian (see, e.g., Kamien and Schwartz 1991, p. 237; Chang
1992, pp. 300–303). The current value Lagrangian for our problem is8:
L = π(Nt , ht ) + B(1 − Mt ) − C(Dt ) + P(Mt ) + λt
(
b1 Rt (Nt , Mt )
1 + b2 Rt (Nt , Mt ) − μNt − ht
)








b1 Rt (Nt , Mt )





where λt is the current value shadow price (or value) of an additional unit of fish stock on
the reef, ϕt is the current value shadow price (or value) of an additional unit of the mangrove
stock, and i (i = 1−3) are the Lagrangian multipliers on the state constraints. The shadow
prices are determined jointly with the harvest, conversion, fish population, and mangrove
coverage levels. The first-order necessary conditions are (along with the initial conditions):
8 An advantage of this approach is that the shadow prices on the stock variables are continuous while the
shadow prices on the state constraints are piecewise continuous (Kamien and Schwartz 1991, p. 237). The der-
ivation of Eq. 7 follows directly from Chang (1992, p. 301). Notice that we also converted the non-negativity
constraints from 0 ≤ Nt to −Nt ≤ 0. The same holds for the mangrove constraint.
123
Ecological and Economic Dynamics 251
∂L
∂ht






= −CDt + ϕt FDt + 1 FDt + 2 FDt set= 0 (9)
dλ
dt
= δλ − ∂L
∂N
= δλ − πN − (λ + 3)
(
b1 RN





= δϕ − ∂L
∂M
= δϕ − BM − PM − (λ + 3)
(
b1 RM





= b1 Rt (Nt , Mt )
1 + b2 Rt (Nt , Mt ) − μNt − ht (12)
d Mt
dt
= F(Dt ) (13)
Mt ≤ 1 1[1 − Mt ] = 0 d1/dt ≤ 0 [= 0 when Mt < 1] (14)
−Mt ≤ 0 2[−Mt ] = 0 d2/dt ≤ 0 [= 0 when − Mt < 0] (15)
−Nt ≤ 0 3[−Nt ] = 0 d3/dt ≤ 0 [= 0 when − Nt < 0] (16)
d L
d1
= −F(Dt ) ≥ 0 1 ≥ 0 1 d Ld1 = 0 (17)
d L
d2





b1 Rt (Nt , Mt )
1 + b2 Rt (Nt , Mt ) − μNt − ht
]
≥ 0 3 ≥ 0 3 d Ld3 = 0 (19)
where πh(πN ) is the derivative of the profit function with respect to h(N ), CD is the deriva-
tive of the cost function with respect to D, FD is the derivative of the conversion production
function with respect to D, BM is the derivative of the net benefits of development with
respect to M , PM is the derivative of the storm protection net benefits with respect to M , and
RM (RN ) is the derivative of the recruitment function with respect to M(N ).
Before discussing the economic content of the conditions, it is important to point out that
if all of the state and non-negativity constraints are non-binding, then i = 0 for i = 1, 2, 3
and the necessary conditions revert back to standard Hamiltonian conditions (Eqs. 8, 9, 10,
11, 12, and 13 would apply).9
From the harvest optimality condition (Eq. 8), it is evident that when the harvest is positive
the shadow price of the fish stock is equal to the marginal profit from another unit of harvest
(πh = λt ). Not surprisingly, the more profitable the fishery, the greater the shadow price of
the fish stock. Equation (8) allows for the possibility that h∗t is zero over some interval (or for
all t if the fishery is not profitable to operate in). A temporary moratorium is optimal when
πh ≤ λt (assuming Nt > 0) or the shadow price is greater than the instantaneous returns
from harvesting a unit of the stock in period t . A temporary moratorium is likely if the initial
fish stock is significantly below its steady-state value, where rebuilding the stock as fast as
possible is potentially economically efficient. A similar condition is found in linear-in-effort
fishery bioeconomic models that are characterized by singular controls (Clark 1990).
When Dt is non-zero and the proportion of mangrove coverage is above zero and less
than one, the optimality condition for conversion (Eq. 9) shows that the shadow price on
mangroves is equal to the ratio of the marginal cost to the marginal product of conversion,
9 For a discussion of the complimentary slackness condition applied to Eqs. 14, 15, 16, see Chang (1992,
p. 302).
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where higher marginal costs or lower marginal product lead to a lower shadow price of man-
groves. Under these conditions, Eq. 9 also illustrates that the shadow price on mangroves is
positive when restoration is occurring (Dt < 0) and that the shadow price is negative when
development is occurring (recall that development benefits are defined as B(1 − Mt )).
Equations (10) and (11) represent the (endogenous) dynamics of the shadow prices over
time (called the adjoint or costate equations), which depend on the ecological and economic
conditions in the ecosystem.
When the mangrove state constraint changes from nonbinding (Mt < 1) to binding (Mt =
1), Eqs. 14 and 17 describe how 1 and d1/dt impact the system. In particular, Eq. 17
imposes that d M/dt must either be zero (not changing) or decreasing at the boundary, which
corresponds to either zero or positive (development) conversion effort. Similar conditions
follow from the other state constraints.
Without putting additional restrictions on the profit function, we cannot gain much traction
on the problem. Following our assumptions on the curvature of fishing profits, we assume
fishing profits are
π(h, N ) = (α − βh)h − c
N
h, (20)
where α is the choke price, β is the slope of the demand curve, and c is a cost parameter.
The per unit cost of harvest in Eq. 20 is a function of the fish stock—it depends inversely on
the fish population. Given that these habitats are often found in remote areas of developing
countries, we follow Barbier (2007) in specifying the responsiveness of fish prices to catch
levels.
2.4 Optimal Interior Steady-State
Following steps outlined in Kamien and Schwartz (1991), we derive the “Golden rule” equa-
tions for the optimal fish stock size and mangroves at the steady-state. We put aside for now
the possibility of corner solutions in the steady-state (e.g. all development, all mangroves,
and no fishing). We explicitly include the possible for corner solutions both in the transition
and at the steady-state in the numerical analysis. Specifically, the equations that correspond



















Cost of catching another fish
in terms of the reduced




















(1 + b2 R(N , M))2
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Marginal benefits in the fishery
, (22)
where
G(N , M) = b1 R(N , M)
1 + b2 R(N , M) − μN , (23)
and the subscripts correspond to the derivatives of the functions with respect to the variables.
Recall that setting Eq. 12 to zero implies that the steady-state harvest level is equal to Eq. 23.
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Beginning with the mangroves, the only feasible steady-state level of conversion D∗ is
zero (Eq. 13). Equation 22 illustrates that the optimal extent of mangroves M∗ balances
the returns from development (BM ) against the returns from storm protection (PM ) and the
returns from fishing, which depends on the per unit value of catch at the steady-state and how
mangroves affect recruitment. Everything else being equal, in the optimal steady state, higher
development benefits will result in more cleared mangroves while higher fishery returns and
storm protection values will result in less cleared mangroves.
Not surprisingly, the optimal fish stock on the reef follows the standard bioeconomic cap-
ital-theoretic result (Clark 1990) where the social planner sets the optimal stock level such
that the (instantaneous) returns in perpetuity from harvesting another fish (instantaneously)
at the steady-state less the opportunity cost is equal to the rate of return of selling the fish
and investing the proceeds in capital markets. The opportunity cost is the (instantaneous)
reduction in the (average) productivity of the system weighted by the stock dependent costs
of fishing in perpetuity from taking out an additional unit of the stock forever.
Since the recruitment function depends on the nature of how species utilize habitat, the
assumptions regarding facultative and obligate behavior have direct implications for the
optimal steady-state levels of mangroves and fish stocks. If the species has a facultative
relationship—that is, there is some survivorship of recruits that do not depend on the man-
groves—then the value of the mangroves is less than for an obligate relationship, everything
else being equal. Furthermore, we can show that in the limit as the species becomes less and
less dependent on mangroves that the coupling in Eqs. 21 and 22 goes to zero.
The interdependent optimality conditions for mangroves and fishing in Eqs. 21 and 22 can
also become effectively decoupled if the planner ignores the value of mangroves in fishery
production when determining how much mangroves to conserve for storm protection. In this
case, the level of mangroves is set such that the marginal gains from clearing for development
are equal to the marginal gains from storm protection, which are the marginal opportunity
costs of clearing the habitat. The decision regarding the optimal fish stock would take the
extent of mangroves as given. The resulting optimal fish stock would be lower than in the
case where the planner takes all values of the mangroves into account, everything else being
equal.10
3 Numerical Analysis
In this section, we explore the dynamics of how to get to the optimal steady-state when the
species has a facultative or obligate relationship with mangroves. We also consider the cases
where the planner does and does not take into account the storm protection benefits from
mangroves. In all of the cases, finding the dynamic path in Fig. 1 entails solving the set of
necessary conditions from a set of initial conditions for mangroves.
One solution technique available to solve high dimension non-linear optimal control prob-
lems is to solve for the equations that define the two-point boundary value problem (TPBVP)
and use a reverse or forward shooting algorithm (Judd 1998; Bryson 1999). The boundary
conditions are determined by the initial conditions and a salvage value function (defined
for a large and finite time for an infinite horizon problem by, for example, converting the
formulation to the Bolza form of an optimal control problem). A potential issue with the
TPBVP method is that the equations are often derived under the assumption that the controls
10 Swallow (1990) showed that development will occur too soon or too fast and that a greater cumulative quan-
tity of development will occur when decisions in the fishery and development sectors are made independent
of each other.
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are interior solutions. In our formulation, we do not want to impose an interior solution, as
there are likely many interesting cases where the optimal steady-state for mangroves consists
of all development or conservation and includes fishing moratoriums (catch set to zero for
some period of time).
Another often more robust method is to use collocation techniques that are based on
minimizing a set of residual functions at a set of collocation points/nodes (Judd 1998).11
Collocation techniques can be applied directly to Eq. 6 (Vlassenbroeck and Vandooren 1988;
Goto and Kawable 2000) or applied to the TPBVP (Ascher and Petzold 1998). We choose
the former, because it converts the optimal control problem into a parameter optimization
problem where you are solving for the coefficients of the approximating polynomial function.
The transformed optimization problem can then be solved using constrained nonlinear pro-
gramming algorithms (Vlassenbroeck and Vandooren 1988). An advantage of this method is
that it includes corner solutions as part of the optimal dynamic solution for all or part of the
path. It also incorporates state and control constraints in a meaningful and rigorous fashion.
Collocation techniques require that the numerical solution satisfies a set of residual con-
ditions at a set of collocation points that span the solution space (Ascher and Petzold 1998;
Judd 1998). There are a number of different strategies for picking the location and num-
ber of these points and we utilize 60 Gaussian collocation points. Convergence was met at
10e−5 or higher resolution and took on average 25–50 iterations. The large-scale non-linear
constrained parameter optimization problem is solved using the KNITRO solvers within the
TOMLAB/PROPT state of the art optimization package for Matlab (release 2009a).
In the numerical analysis we employ functional forms for mangrove conversion (F(D)),
cost of adjustment for conversion (C(D)), share of juveniles that utilize the mangroves
(W (M)), value of development (B(1 − M)) and storm protection (P(M)). With a focus on
the qualitative results (not quantitative) of the numerical analysis, our strategy in specifying
these functions is to utilize the simplest form that is consistent with their properties. We
explore the implications of these functional forms along with the values of the some of the
key economic and ecological parameters in the sensitivity analysis.
To account for possible asymmetries in the marginal product of conversion to develop-
ment versus restoration, we employ F(Dt ) = (1 − eDt ), where F(0) = 0, FD < 0 and
FDD < 0, which captures the notion that restoration (D < 0) is more difficult than clear-
ing for development (D > 0).12 The share of juveniles utilizing the mangroves is equal
to W (M) = Mω, where ω specifies the curvature of W (M) with a change in mangroves.
The benefits of development are B(1 − M) = υ1(1 − M)υ2 and the storm protection ben-
efits follow Barbier et al. (2008) where the specification is P(M) = ρ1 Mρ2 . The costs of
development are C(D) = cd D2.
The ecological and economic parameters for the initial setting and their definition are
listed in Table 1. We parameterize the fishing sector such that the open-access equilibrium
level corresponds to approximately 10% of the unexploited stock levels (Myers and Worm
2003).13 We also parameterize the benefits of development and storm protection such that the
social planner chooses an interior level of mangroves when the fishing sector is not considered
part of the objective for mangrove management.
11 Another potential solution technique is dynamic programming (DP) where we could use value function
iteration to solve for the optimal solution (Judd 1998). DP is an especially useful method when considering
the role of stochasticity and decision-making under uncertainty.
12 We could also include a sluggish (or faster) response between conversion effort and mangrove stock
dynamics by specifying F(D) = ξ(1 − eD), where ξ is a response parameter.
13 The steady-state open-access levels are solved for by setting average fishing profits to zero and the dynamics
of the fish stock to zero for a given level of mangroves.
123
Ecological and Economic Dynamics 255
Table 1 Ecological and economic parameters
Parameter Level Notes
Ecology b1 1 Survival rate of juvenile recruits at low
density
b1/b2 10 Saturation rate of recruitment in each t
Natural mortality rate, μ .1 10% mortality of the adult standing stock in
each t , μ ∈ [0,1]
Seagrass survivorship rate, θ 1 Survivorship of larval and juveniles in the
seagrass beds, θ ∈ [0, 1]
Mangrove survivorship rate,
SM
.5 Survivorship of juveniles that go to the man-
groves after the seagrass beds,
SM ∈ [0,1]
Reef survivorship rate, Sr Facultative: .5SM
Obligate: 0
Survivorship of juveniles that go to the reefs




1 If γ is greater than one, then larval
production is increasing in the adult
standing stock
Mangrove utilization, ω .5 Share of juveniles going to the mangroves is
W (M) = M .5
Economics Choke price, α 7 Vertical intercept of the demand curve
Slope of demand curve, β .75 Slope of the demand curve, when harvest
equals to α/β the price is zero
Harvesting costs, c 20 Cost per unit of harvesting, when holding the
stock size constant
Discount rate, δ 5%
Benefit of development υ1 = 7, υ2 = 1 Describes the magnitude and curvature of
the benefits of development





Describes the magnitude and curvature of
the benefits of storm protection
We first highlight the results in the base case where the social planner does not take into
account the values from storm protection from the mangroves (ρ1 = 0). The second case
captures the case where storm protection is explicitly part of the objective function. In each
case, we start from two initial conditions to highlight the dynamic paths and stability of the
solution.
Case 1: Storm protection values are omitted from objective function
For the obligate and facultative settings, we derive the input trade-off curve between the
steady-state stock level and the extent of mangroves cleared by solving for the optimal steady-
state of fish stock by varying a fixed (for all periods) level of mangroves. We then illustrate
the optimal steady-state of mangroves and fish stocks when both are chosen by the planner,
the solution of which corresponds to a point on the curve. We find that there are differences
in the trade-off curve (see Fig. 3) between the obligate and facultative setting. In the faculta-
tive case, N ss does not go to zero as the proportion of mangroves developed goes to one. This
result, which also affects the slope of the trade-off curve, is due to the fact that the species
can utilize the reef habitat directly and as such, when there are no mangroves the stock does
not go extinct. Previous research on mangroves has focused on the obligate case.
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Fig. 3 Optimal dynamic solution of harvest and mangrove conversion without storm protection (Case 1).
Note: The facultative case corresponds to the top row and the bottom row illustrates the obligate case. The
column headings correspond to the vertical axes. In the first column, a dot represents the optimal steady-state
levels. The optimal transition path for two initial conditions is presented: one condition corresponds to 125%
of the steady-state levels of N and M (dotted line) and the other to 35% of the levels (dashed line). In columns
two and three, the first 20 years of the transition paths are highlighted to show the differences across the cases.
The insets illustrate the convergence to the steady-state solution that occurs within 50 time steps
After having identified the trade-off the curve, the question is: how do you go from the
current level (initial conditions) to the frontier and to which point on the frontier? In Fig. 3
we illustrate the optimal path for two initial conditions, where one condition corresponds to
125% of the steady-state levels of N and M and the other corresponds to 35% of the levels.
The latter represents the situation where the planner is engaging in rebuilding the fish and
mangrove habitats and the former is where both are initially above their long-run optimal
equilibrium.
Figure 3 illustrates the paths and the locations of the optimal steady-states on the trade-
off curves. For the temporal transitions, in columns two and three, we focus on the first
20 time steps, where most of the interesting dynamics occur but the insets illustrate that con-
vergence to the steady-state occurred in each run (approximately between 50 and 80 time
steps). Although there is little difference in the optimal steady-state fish stock levels between
the facultative and obligate cases, we do find that there is a substantial difference in equi-
librium mangrove levels, where the steady-state in the obligate case corresponds to greater
mangroves.
The qualitative nature of the paths is also remarkably similar across the obligate and fac-
ultative settings. For example, when the system needs to be rebuilt (both Nt=0 and Mt=0 are
below the steady-state solution), the planner institutes a temporary moratorium on fishing—a
result we would not necessarily have found had we not accounted for the potential h∗t ≈ 0
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solution in the numerical algorithm.14 Because the dependency on mangroves is greater in
the obligate setting and the long-run equilibrium is further from the initial condition, the
planner forgoes fishing for slightly longer than in the facultative setting to allow the stock
time to rebuild.
In addition to the outlay for restoration costs, there is also an opportunity cost to restora-
tion activities in terms of forgone development benefits. In spite of these costs, the planner
finds it profitable to invest in habitat to gain the fishery benefits in the initial periods (recall
storm protection is not considered in this case). Interestingly and unexpected, we find that the
optimal solution is to overshoot the mangrove equilibrium (restore more than what is needed
to reach the steady-state). How could restoring the habitat only to clear it at a later date be
optimal? Essentially, the planner is getting additional benefits earlier from fishing (though
at a decreasing rate) from restoring the habitat via faster recovery rates of the population.
Eventually, however, the planner finds that it pays to divest in habitat and accrue the gains
from development. Overall, the magnitude of restoration is greater in the obligate setting,
which is being driven largely by the differences in the steady-state levels.
The optimal paths from a point where the fishery and mangrove are not overexploited are
qualitatively similar across the cases and to the case of rebuilding. Interestingly, overshooting
is still part of the solution.
Case 2: Storm protection values are included in the objective function
We now ask the question: what are the implications of including non-fishery benefits from
mangroves on the optimal amount of development and fish stock? We maintain the param-
eter assumptions used to generate Fig. 3, except now there is an in situ value to mangroves
from storm protection as specified in Table 1. As we found in case 1, the steady-state fish
stock levels are similar across the two obligate and facultative settings since the steady-states
reside on the upper (flatter) portion of the trade-off curve. We also find that the mangrove
steady-state is greater in the obligate setting (see Fig. 4).
Relative to the case with no storm protection, we find that the mangrove steady-state is
larger, which is not surprising since we included an additional value to the standing stock
in the objective function. Given the increase in extent of mangroves when in situ values are
incorporated, the fishery is also more productive. In this case, both the steady-state stock and
harvest levels are greater than when storm protection benefits are not included.
Figure 4 illustrates that the overshoot in the mangrove dynamics across the two cases is
still part of the optimal solution. In the obligate setting, a difference between the two cases is
that during the overshoot, the planner completely restores the mangroves (no mangroves are
developed) and maintains this level for a number of periods before redeveloping the habitat.15
When we increase the adjustment costs of converting mangroves, we still find the overshoot
but whether it pays to restore all mangroves depends on the returns to storm protection and
fishing. We also find that a moratorium on fishing is not part of the optimal solution. The lack
of a moratorium is due both to the economic value in the system being more diverse than just
14 The temporary moratorium on fishing is dependent on the initial conditions and the economic and eco-
logical characteristics of the fishery. For example, if we increase the initial fish population level (50% of the
steady-state level instead of 35%), then the temporary moratorium is no longer part of the optimal solution
(catches start low and increase over time but are always positive). Numerically, h∗t is less than 1e–4 during
the period we are labeling a temporary moratorium.
15 Recall that we are using storm protection as a mnemonic for potential in situ values. A natural question to
ask is whether the value in storm protection is tied to the level of development/infrastructure of mangroves.
We abstract away from this level of detail given the nature of the model and focus on qualitative insights.
Applying these tools to a particular location would necessitate consideration of these interactions.
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Fig. 4 Optimal dynamic solution of harvest and mangrove conversion with storm protection (Case 2). Note:
The facultative case corresponds to the top row and the bottom row illustrates the obligate case. The column
headings correspond to the vertical axes. In the first column, a dot represents the optimal steady-state levels.
The optimal transition path for two initial conditions is presented: one condition corresponds to 125% of the
steady-state levels of N and M (dotted line) and the other to 35% of the levels (dashed line). In columns two
and three, the first 20 years of the transition paths are highlighted to show the differences across the cases. The
insets illustrate the convergence to the steady-state solution that occurs within 50 time steps
fishery returns and to the greater initial endowment of mangroves. As such, the planner can
afford to fish at the outset even though it slows rebuilding.
3.1 Optimal Payments for Ecosystem Services
The dynamic paths and long-run steady states depicted in cases 1 and 2 are consistent with
a benevolent coastal planner. We now use the model to identify the payment for ecosystem
service (PES) schedule for mangroves that corresponds to the optimal trajectory.16 Assuming
for the moment that there are no values from storm protection, Eqs. 11 and 22 illustrate a
potential optimal payment for ecosystem service (PES) mechanism by which either a coral-
reef fishermen’s cooperative (e.g., territorial user right (TURF)) or the government might
16 In order to focus on the PES for mangroves, we assume that the stock externality in the coral reef fishery
has already been addressed either through the creation of a cooperative or some other form of catch share.
This assumption allows us to put aside mechanism design issues with respect to PES systems, such as free
riding incentives—issues that are important directions for future research.
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provide via a subsidy to compensate coastal developers for the lost development benefits.17
In particular, the payment for ecosystem services (per unit) provided by mangroves for the
provisioning of fish catch at time t is given by (assuming h∗t > 0)18:
PESt =
[





(1 + b2 R(N∗t , M∗t ))2
]
(24)
where starred variables represent the dynamically optimal levels. The fishermen’s willing-
ness to pay to forgo development, therefore, depends on the marginal value to the fishery
from an additional unit of mangroves at time t . We decompose the marginal value into the
value associated with a change in harvest and the change in the ecological productivity of
the system from an additional unit of mangroves. The former is determined by the demand
for fish and the costs of catching fish, along with the productivity of the fishery (embedded
in h∗t ) and fish stock size. The latter depends explicitly on how species utilize the habitat and
the density-dependent process operating in conjunction with the species-habitat functional
relationships.
When values associated with standing stock exist, such as storm protection, we would
expect that insofar as the mangroves occur on private property that the coastal developers
would potentially take these values into account in their decision calculus.19 On the other
hand, if the mangroves fall on public property and/or if the changes in storm protection are
not appropriated to a particular coastal development project, the full costs of clearing are
not internalized. In this case, a land-use planning agency might ask developers to pay a fee
equal to the marginal value derived from storm protection for clearing in order to induce the
optimal extent of mangroves. In our example, any storm protection values are assumed to be
internalized by landowners.
The dynamic path of PES for cases in which storm protection values are positive or zero
and under both facultative and obligate species-habitat relationships is presented in Fig. 5
panel A. To highlight how PES might change over time, we consider the degraded ecosystem
and fish population setting described in the previous section.20 Thus the targeted conversion
path is given by the increasing and concave curve depicted in column three of Figs. 3 and
4. Since the optimal level of restoration starts high and attenuates at a decreasing rate, PES
follow suit. As indicated in Eq. 22 payment varies with respect to whether there exist benefits
from storm protection. When such in situ benefits exist (and are internalized by the private
landowners as assumed here) PES need only make up the difference between marginal ben-
efits from development and storm protection. PES in the case of no storm protection benefits
are greater since the payment must compensate for the entirety of development benefits
forgone.21
Since PES depend on marginal benefits of Mt to the fishery, which is determined by
the nature of the species-habitat relationship, we find that when the fish population is more
17 The direction of payments depends on the initial allocation of development rights; for illustrative purposes,
we examine the case in which private landowners are endowed with these rights such that payments to forgo
mangrove development flow from a fishermen’s cooperative or the government to private landowners.
18 The condition that holds when 0 = ht * is PESt = λ∗t
[
b1 RMt
(1+b2 R(N∗t ,M∗t ))2
]
, where recall πh ≤ λt .
19 A lower insurance payment is one way that these values could be internalized by the developer.
20 The dynamics of the PES are similar for the other initial conditions, except that the PES starts below the
long-run level and is increasing.
21 This result is sensitive to the assumption over whether private landowners internalize the storm protection
benefits. If such in situ benefits are not internalized then the payments from the fishermen would be insufficient
to induce the socially optimal solution of mangroves.
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Fig. 5 Optimal PES payment schedule. Note: In panels A and B, the analysis is carried out for the case with
(ρ1 > 0) and without (ρ1 = 0) storm protection and for the obligate (Sr = 0) and facultative (Sr > 0) case.
Panel A illustrates the levels of the PES in each period and panel B illustrates the percent difference between
fishing profits and the PES in each period
dependent on the mangrove habitat (the obligate case) more restoration is demanded both in
terms of the immediate rate of conversion and the long-run steady state than in the facultative
case (see Figs. 3 and 4). PES under the obligate case is, therefore, greater in the short run.
Finally, we observe that PES under obligate and facultative settings converge when there
are no storm protection benefits while in the alternative case they do not. This result depends
on the linearity (or nonlinearity) of benefits to development and to storm protection with
respect to Mt . Since we have assumed linear benefits to development (see Table 1), marginal
development benefits are constant across Mt . While the steady-state level of M under the
obligate case is greater, under no storm protection benefits the long run PES still converges
since marginal development benefits are independent of M . Storm protection benefits, in
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contrast, are assumed to be increasing and concave in M . Therefore, the residual opportunity
cost to be covered by PES in this case depends on the steady-state level of M and on whether
the setting is obligate or facultative.
To put the magnitude of these payments in perspective, Fig. 5 panel B illustrates the differ-
ence between fishing profits and the PES payment in each period t as a percentage of the PES
payment.22 During the initial moratorium when the fish stock is rebuilding, fishing profits
are zero, but the PES payment is still positive (corresponds to a negative percentage in Fig. 5
panel B). The threshold time where fishing profits become greater than PES payments for the
obligate cases is less than two periods with storm protection and less than 10 periods without
storm protection. In general, the relative magnitudes of fishing profits and PES payments
depend on the ecological relationships and whether storm protection benefits are included.
Consistent with the actual payment amounts, we find that the fishing profits are significantly
greater than the PES payment when storm protection benefits are included (on the order of
300–400%).
PES payments greater than fishing profits during the rebuilding period highlights a poten-
tial issue regarding self-financing that can arise when setting up PES mechanisms in degraded
ecosystems. That is, without access to capital either from government loans, subsidies, or
private sources, the ability of the fishing cooperative or group to pay the land developer to
restore mangroves is potentially in jeopardy. To our knowledge, this potential issue has not
been raised yet in the discussion of PES mechanisms.
3.2 Sensitivity Analysis
The optimal ecosystem service payment depends on the ecological and economic parameters
of the system and it is not always clear how changes in one parameter will affect the PES
schedule. For example, a decrease in the survivorship rate of the juveniles on the seagrass
beds affects the productivity of a unit of mangroves, which in turn potentially reduces the
profitability of the fishery (similar to a decrease in the intrinsic growth rate in a logistic
population model). On the one hand, a less profitable fishery would be willing to pay less,
everything else being equal. This effect is compounded by the potential strategy of harvesting
less and increasing the standing stock of the fish population, everything else being equal. On
the other hand, investing in more mangroves is another strategy to offset the decline in sea-
grass survivorship, implying that fisherman might be willing to pay more to have a greater
amount of mangroves conserved in the long-run and to pay more sooner to speed up the
process of restoration.
In this section, we undertake a sensitivity analysis on the some of the key parameters
and functional forms assumed in the base case to get a better picture of how the optimal
PES schedule depends on the ecological and economic context within which the services
are delivered. We continue to start from the initial conditions used to derive Fig. 5, but the
optimal paths and steady-states will differ from the base case.23 We alter both the baseline
ecological model and economic model in two ways. For the ecological model, we investigate
the effect of two adjustments that both significantly decrease the juvenile survivorship: a
20% decrease in the survivorship rate on seagrass beds, and a linear (rather than concave)
specification of mangrove utilization (W [M]). For the economic model we examine a 50%
increase in the cost of conversion, and a 50% decrease in the slope of the demand curve.
22 Specifically, we are computing 100 * (πt − PESt )/PESt .
23 Qualitatively, the optimal path of harvest, conversion, and PES payment dynamics are similar to those
illustrated in the base case and are therefore not presented.
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Table 2 Sensitivity analysis summary
A number of key effects for each case are summarized in Table 2, including: the initial
change in the rate of mangrove restoration, the change in the length of a fishing moratorium,
the change in the steady-state extent of mangroves, the change in the steady state fish stock,
and the change in the time-span before PES payments can be self-financed through fishing
profits.
3.2.1 Seagrass Survivorship
Because we have found that there are potentially important interactions between services
in terms of the amount and timing of the optimal PES schedule, we hypothesize that there
must also be interdependencies across different habitats. This is especially likely when the
production chain of ecosystem services entails multiple habitats.
We find that indeed there is an effect on the relative sizes of fishing profits and PES pay-
ments when we decrease the seagrass survivorship rate. We also find that the magnitude and
qualitative pattern of the effects depend on the other ecosystem services. In the case of no
storm protection, for example, the PES payment is greater than fishing profits for a longer
period of time and the PES is a larger share of fishing profits than in the base case. Without
storm protection, we find that there is a slower rate of restoration and a longer fishing mora-
torium relative to the base case. The optimal steady-state of mangroves in both the facultative
and obligate setting is on the order of 15–20% larger and the steady-state fish stock is on the
order of 9–13% lower than in the base case. In the long-run in the obligate setting, fishing
profits are less than 4% of the PES payment implying that in this setting at least the PES
payments are a significant outlay relative to the economic values from fishing.
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With storm protection, PES payments quickly become significantly less than fishing prof-
its though it takes slightly longer than in the base case. Restoration occurs at a faster rate,
as there are additional benefits from mangroves. Interestingly, the fishing moratorium is still
longer than in the base case and this is because even though the level of mangroves is increas-
ing at a faster rate, the increase is not enough to offset the lower survivorship of juveniles
in the seagrass beds. As with the case of no storm protection benefits, the drop in seagrass
survivorship leads to an increase in the steady-state extent of mangroves and a decrease in
the steady-state fish stock level.
3.2.2 Mangrove Utilization
The assumption that the share of juveniles utilizing mangroves is linear (ω = 1) over M
rather than concave (ω = .5) results in a decrease in the proportion of juveniles utilizing
mangroves (and thus fewer juveniles benefiting from the bump in survivorship from utilizing
this rearing habitat), everything else being equal.24 Overall, this adjustment to the form of
W [M] reduces the number of juveniles eventually making it back to the reefs, particularly
in the obligate setting, which is entirely dependent on the mangroves for recruits.
Beginning with the case of no storm protection, we find a divergence between the facul-
tative and obligate setting across a number of dimensions. The facultative setting has lower
rates of restoration, a 9% lower steady-state level of mangroves, a 11% lower steady-state
level of fish stock, and a longer fishing moratorium than the base case. With the substitu-
tion possibilities across the habitats (under a facultative setting) and the current assumptions
regarding the differences in survivorship, mangroves are not as important. The opposite is
true for the obligate setting. Here we find that optimal steady-state of mangroves is over
60% larger than in the base case (9% larger steady-state fishing stock) and level of the PES
payments are greater than in the base case to both speed up the recovery of the fish population
and to pay for the additional conservation of mangroves.
With storm protection, the optimal steady-state level of mangroves in the both the fac-
ultative and obligate setting is larger than in the base case (on the order of 20–40%). The
resulting payment schedule is greater than in the base case and consistent with our earlier
results; the payment in the obligate setting is greater than in the facultative setting and both
are much smaller share of fishing profits.
3.2.3 Cost of Conversion
What is the impact on the relative values of fishing profits and PES payments when the cost
of conversion of mangroves is greater? In the steady-state, the incremental cost of conversion
does not affect the level of mangroves or fish stocks (since the marginal cost approaches zero
as D approaches zero) and therefore, any differences from the base case should be transitory.
When we increase the cost of conversion by 50%, we indeed find only a transitory effect
where the payment is larger to compensate developers for restoration activities (recall we are
starting at an initial condition with Mt below its long-run steady-state). Not surprisingly then,
increasing the cost of conversion increases the time span over which profits are not sufficient
to self finance the PES. Across the board, the steady state level of M and N are unchanged,
but it is approached at a slower rate of restoration. The length of fishing moratorium differs
by the species habitat association but just as in the base case, there is no moratorium in the
obligate setting with storm protection.
24 Note that W [M] = M is everywhere below W [M] = M .5 on the unit interval, except for the case of all
mangroves (M = 1) or no mangroves (M = 0) where there is no difference.
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3.2.4 Slope of the Demand Curve
When we decrease the slope of the demand curve (holding the vertical intercept constant)
the fishery is more profitable for a given level of harvest, everything else being equal. The
time to self-financed PES is shorter than in the base case for all settings (with or without
storm protection benefits; obligate or facultative species-habitat relationship). We also find
that in the obligate case without storm protection, the ratio of fishing profits to PES is about
1.59 in the steady-state. Because the PES is a smaller share of fishing profits, this ratio might
be more politically acceptable than those found in the previous analysis. We also find that
the initial length of the fishing moratorium is longer in all cases while the initial investment
in restoration is dependent on whether storm protection benefits are included. We also find
that the optimal steady-state level of mangroves is larger and the steady-state fish stock is
smaller in each of the cases. The planner, therefore, is trading-off investing in greater levels
of mangroves during the transition, which lead to a faster growth rate of the fish populations,
against a lower steady-state -stock of fish due to greater fishing pressure (and fishing profits).
4 Conclusion
Building on recent advances in ecology on the understanding of fishery-habitat linkages
(Mumby et al. 2004; Harborne et al. 2006; Mumby 2006), we advance the economic-eco-
logical science for valuing multiple types of fish habitats as natural capital. In particular,
our modeling framework better illuminates the mechanisms through which multiple types
of habitats impact the population dynamics of fish and how key ecological and economic
variables inform decisions on how to value and conserve habitats, using mangroves, seagrass,
and coral reefs as our model system.
Our paper also contributes to the broader goal that calls for the further development and
refinement of production methods to measure and value ecosystem services (Heal et al. 2005;
Daily and Matson 2008). With more realistic depictions of ecological production functions,
the possibilities to develop payment systems for ecosystem services and other conservation
tools that take into account their total economic value are enhanced. Such values will better
inform how to get the greatest return per conservation dollar spent. Incorporating a more
accurate value of mangroves into resource management is arguably a crucial step in moving
towards sustainable use of coastal environments (Barbier 1993; Rönnbäck 1999; Lugo 2002).
We illustrate in our model system that the qualitative nature of the path to the long-run
steady state is similar for the obligate and facultative settings, while the steady state level of
mangroves is (intuitively) greater in an obligate relationship. We show that the optimal path
can involve temporarily overshooting the long run mangrove stock. In the case of rebuilding,
for example, the overshoot is optimal, because additional mangroves speed up the rebuild-
ing of fish stocks. The robustness of the optimal overshoot is an interesting area for future
research, especially when the assumption that restored habitat is immediately and equally
ecologically productive for the fishery is relaxed. Other interesting research questions include
measuring the costs of going to other (not optimal) points on the frontier and the economic-
ecological differences in the transition to these non-optimal points.
Ultimately, we find that efficient PES incentives for habitat conservation depend critically
on the nature of the ecological and economic conditions where the services are provided and
demanded. Generally, the additional dynamic incentives will need to be equal to the marginal
benefit to the fishery, which includes current as well as future values. When private marginal
in situ values (e.g. storm protection) exist and are internalized, the necessary additional PES
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payment to account for the value of mangroves in the fishing sector is reduced. The political-
economy implication of this finding is that by including multiple ecosystem services, each
stakeholder group that benefits from an ecosystem function with multiple services will likely
have lower outlays relative to the situation where fewer services are considered, everything
else being equal (at least in the case of synergistic ecosystem service provision).
We also find that for degraded systems that the PES payments can exceed contemporane-
ous fishing profits. This result highlights a potential difficulty in instituting PES schemes in
the very places (degraded ecosystems) that likely need them the most. In particular, the PES
program would need to be coupled with access to capital to help finance the payments until
the value of the ecosystem services derived from the ecosystem function can pay for itself.
We also find that in some cases the PES payments comprise a significant share of the fishing
profits. Our analysis also shows that details that will likely affect the political adoption of
these schemes, such as how long until fishing profits are greater than PES payments and the
relative size of the payment, are dependent on the local ecological and economic conditions.
To illustrate the dynamic and interrelated nature of ecosystem service payments, we
abstract away from important mechanism design and governance issues, such as informa-
tion asymmetries, free-riding incentives, transaction type (public-private, private-private),
property rights, etc., that are associated with market or incentive schemes. Our analysis
also demonstrates that the level of knowledge of the ecological-economic system required
to develop efficient PES programs is quite extensive (see, e.g., Heal et al. 2005 and Bar-
bier et al. 2008). Critical parameters—for example the survivorship of juveniles utilizing
the mangroves—may be highly uncertain. Optimal learning over whether the species-hab-
itat relationship is obligate or facultative could be embedded into the planner’s investment
problem. Challenging questions for future research revolve around how fishing policies or
mangrove policies (e.g. payments for ecosystem services) can be used efficiently to manage
the resources while simultaneously learning about the ecological-economic system.
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